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Transnational organized crime has been prevalent
during the last century, but it recently has been
recognized as a threat to the world order. Governments
throughout the world, along with the intergovernmental
organizations identified this phenomenon as a new threat to
domestic and international security.
This paper attempts to explain the impacts of
transnational organized crime on the functioning of
democratic societies by adopting the Russian Organized
Crime as case study. The descriptive research with regard
to definition, scope and organization of transnational
organized crime, along with the objectives, limitations and
methodology of this research will be included in the first
chapter. Recent trends observed in organized crime`s
character and the impact of organized crime on the
political economies of democratic regimes will be contained
in the following chapters. Pre-conditions for a broader
response to transnational organized crime and conclusive
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Some argue that; humanity will never be free of crime
because the human being is a sinner by nature. As the
French criminologist, G. Tarde, wrote: If the tree of crime
with all its roots were ripped out, a gaping abyss would be
left in society. The only question, then, is the depth of
this abyss. Or the nature of the disease: Is this a
gangrene that can be stopped with a scalpel, or is it a
cancerous metastasis, already beyond hope (Wessel, 1995a.
p.1)?
In November 2000, the United Nations General Assembly
at its Millenium meeting adopted a convention against
transnational organized crime. It is unique, being the
first legally binding UN document in the field of crime. It
was opened for signature at a high-level conference that
was held in Palermo, Italy, in December 2000. After being
signed and ratified by 40 countries, the states party to
the convention would be required to establish in their laws
four criminal offences, which are; participation in an
organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption and
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obstruction of justice.
The instrument systemizes cooperation on such matters
as extradition, mutual legal assistance, transfer of
proceedings and joint investigations. Provisions for victim
and witness protection and guarding legal markets from
infiltration by organized criminal groups are contained, as
well. Parties to the treaty would also provide technical
assistance to developing countries to help them take the
necessary measures and upgrade their capacities in the
fight against organized crime.
Transnational organized crime has been prevalent
during the last century, but it recently has been
recognized as a threat to the world order. In November
1994, the World Inter-Ministerial Conference on
Transnational Organized Crime was held in Naples-Italy. In
1996, the president of the United States, William Clinton
mentioned for the first time the fight against
international organized crime as a matter of national
security (United States Government, 1996). Governments
throughout the world, along with the intergovernmental
organizations such as G-7 group, the Council of Europe and
European Union identified this phenomenon as a new threat
to domestic and international security.
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This sensitivity about the challenges posed by
organized crime arose during the last decade due to two
factors. The end of the cold war changed the focus of
international relations. The recently mounted attack on
transnational organized crime is, indeed, partly a
consequence of the need for security bodies (such as the
CIA, KGB and the Mossad) and international organizations
(such as the UN and the Council of Europe) to develop new
missions in the Post-Cold War era (Shelley 1995b, 464). The
second factor is the observed evolution of organized crime
and its perilous outcomes. In recent years, criminal groups
dramatically expanded their scope and activities worldwide
by taking advantage of the economic and political
globalization, the immigration boom to developed countries
and associated formation of Diaspora networks,
technological progress, inter-regional conflicts and post-
cold war power vacuums within the political-economy and
social structure of newly democratized nations. They also
have established international networks to further their
activities both in legal and illegal markets by employing
sophisticated methods. The seriousness of the problem lays
in the penetration of transnational organized crime into
the political structures, institutions and legal economic
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sectors of democratic regimes, as well as the threat it
poses against domestic and global economies through its
illegal activities and proceedings derived from these
businesses.
As stated above, transnational organized crime has
received increasing attention from law enforcement
agencies, intelligence analysts and academic researchers
and media. Yet, there are many differences with regard to
definition, scope and organization of transnational crime.
There is no consensus on enforcement practices and
problems, future prevention or control strategies.
This research attempts to capture the richness of the
variety of views offered so far in search for an innovative
analysis and diagnosis of the phenomenon. The definition,
scope and organization of transnational organized crime,
along with the objectives, limitations and methodology of
this research will be included in the first chapter. In
understanding the significance of the problem, a study on
recent trends in organized crime`s character carries a
vital importance and it will be the content of the second
chapter. In the third chapter, the impact of organized
crime on the political economies of democracies will be
assessed thoroughly. Russian Organized Crime is chosen as
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the case study in this research because of its highly
visible transnational characteristics and the imminent
threat it poses against Russian state itself and the
national securities of other countries. This profile will
allow a better understanding of the pre-conditions for a
broader response to transnational organized crime. Finally,
conclusive remarks will be the content of the last chapter.
Definitions
Organized crime is intricate and is a relatively new
international threat, thus, understanding of its nature
proves to be limited. The covert nature of organized crime
prevents the direct observation of the destructive and
corroding impacts it has on society. However, not only does
it lead to higher crime rates but also corrupts government
officials and indirectly threatens the legitimacy of the
state. The economy, too, is severely damaged by the
operations of organized crime networks.
Since organized crime encompasses a large array of
illicit operations such as gold and diamond smuggling,
vehicle theft, commercial crime, arms smuggling, money
laundering and drug trade to name a few, it has become a
scourge of international magnitude (Institute of Security
Studies, 1994). Therefore it needs to be understood and
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dealt with accordingly, particularly on an international
scale. In other words, at least a definitional consensus
has to be reached so that an operational strategy can be
developed to counter it. Various characteristics of
organized crime syndicates have been noted in different
definitions such as:
Organized crime is a non-ideological enterprise
involving a number of persons in close social interaction,
organized on a hierarchical basis, with at least three
levels/ranks, for the purpose of securing profit and power
by engaging in illegal and legal activities (Abadinsky,
1987. p.6),
Organized crime is a continuing criminal enterprise
that rationally works to profit from illicit activities
that are in great public demand. Its continuing existence
is maintained through the use of force, threats, and/or the
corruption of public officials (Albanese, 1989. p.5),
…Having well established contacts with national and
international criminal organizations, cartels or mafia
groupings (Shaw, 1998.p.1),
Our working definition of organized crime includes the
following characteristics: a self perpetuating, organized
hierarchy that exists to profit from providing illicit
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goods and services, uses violence in carrying out its
criminal activities, and corrupts public officials to
immunize itself from law enforcement (Kenney & Finckenauer,
1995. p.285),
The term organized crime refers to crime that involves
the co-operation of several different persons or groups for
its successful execution. Organized crime is usually
professional crime (Lindesmith, 1941. p.119),
Organized crime has been defined as a self-
perpetuating criminal conspiracy for power and profit,
utilizing fear and corruption and seeking to obtain
immunity from the law. While the organized crime syndicate
is certainly the largest and best known organized criminal
element, it is by no means the only one. There are local
organizations throughout the nation that would certainly
fall within the definition of organized crime. These
groups, numerous and varied, may be based upon the ethnic
or racial ties or be simply the result of a particular
criminal endeavor (Missouri Task Force on Organized Crime
Report, 1974. p.7-8).
Many attempted definitions of organized crime may not
adequately reflect every aspect of organized crime, with
each definition there seems to be something lacking to
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aptly refer to all known types of organized crime.
Moreover, the definitions, which were developed regarding
organized crime, do not seem to be particularly applicable
to transnational organized crime, although some individual
characteristics may relate. The characteristics put forth
by Maltz can be accepted to reflect the common points in
the organized crime definitions, which are: corruption,
violence, sophistication, continuity, structure,
discipline, ideology (or lack thereof), multiple
enterprises, and involvement in legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises (1994). For instance, the stress on corruption
and violence to control markets in classical organized
crime definitions does not seem central to transnational
organized crime. The usual incentives for violence in
organized crime (discipline of subordinates, succession to
leadership, transactional integrity, territorial
protection) are attenuated when organizations are not
highly centralized and the notion of territoriality is
strained (National Academy of Sciences, 2000). Territories
refer to localness while transnational crime groups seek to
reach broader scopes. This does not necessarily mean that
transnational crime syndicates do not employ violence or
apply to corruption whenever needed. But evidence and
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research imply that these tactics are not adopted merely
for the control of activities and markets as in the case of
domestic organized crime.
On the other hand, a review of the literature
demonstrates a persistent focus on concepts of markets and
centralized organizations. However, partly owing to the
globalization, both legal and illegal enterprises including
terrorist groups have developed an inclination towards
operating in networks. This is highly visible in operating
schemes of Albanian, Nigerian and Russian organized
criminal groups. There are cells as the smallest units, and
while the members of a separate cell are tightly connected
to each other, the relationship between the cells in the
same organization is loose. The collaboration between these
small networks is ensured upon the initiative of an almost
invisible core group.
It must also be noted that, the priority of
conceptions in defining organized crime may differentiate
according to the nature of the activity exercised by crime
groups. While some type of activities, as of drug
smuggling, might require the employment of corruption as a
priority, financial crimes, such as bank fraud and money
laundering necessitates a high degree of sophistication.
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The term of transnational crime was developed by the
United Nations Crime and Criminal Justice branch in 1974.
As described by Mueller, it was a criminological term
consisting a list of five activities: (1) crime as business
organized crime, white collar crime, and corruption; (2)
offenses involving works of art and other cultural
property; (3) criminality associated with drug abuse and
alcoholism especially illicit traffic; (4) violence of
transnational and comparative international significance;
and (5) criminality associated with immigration and flight
from natural disasters and hostilities (1998). In 1995, a
short conceptual definition was added by the United Nations
[UN]: offenses whose interception, prevention and/or direct
effect or indirect effects involved more than one country
(1995). In the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, the definition of an
organized criminal group is established as following:
Organized criminal group shall mean a structured group of
three or more persons existing for a period of time and
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more
serious crime or offenses, in order to obtain directly, or
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit (UN,
2000).
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In this complexity of issues and concepts, arriving at
a single definition proves to be very hard. However, a
theoretical framework maybe derived, before developing a
variety of definitions; and a blend of the
characterizations of the UN definitions could be used as a
starting point. A structured group of three or more
persons, in existence for a period of time, aiming to
commit one or more serious crime or offenses whose
interception, prevention and/or direct or indirect effects
involves more than one country, motivated by direct or
indirect and financial or other material benefits. However,
taking into consideration that the multi-national character
in this definition serves judicial purposes only,
additional parameters are necessary. Transnational criminal
organizations will be considered as organized crime groups
when they are based in one state, they commit their crimes
in one but usually several countries, whose market
definitions are favorable; and they conduct illicit
activities affording low risk of apprehension (Williams,
1994. p.96). In addition, an analysis towards the organized
crime group under focus, and the social, economic and
political context it operates within must be made. The
assessment of the organized crime group must include:
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(1) Hierarchy and structure of the group; command
entities, decision and dispute solution mechanisms,
internal codes and regulations.
(2) The level of availability of capital resources
derived from the activities of the group, and reinvestment
capabilities in legal and illegal businesses; the methods
of capital amassing, the number and the type of illegal
activities involved, the accessibility of specialized
expertise in particular illicit activities, the level of
involvement in a specific activity, and the capacity to
make domestic and international investments in legal and
illegal business.
(3) Scope of intimidation and use of force; the
availability of people specialized in the use of violence,
the accessibility of conventional and unconventional
weaponry for intimidation and protection reasons, the size
and territorial extension of the groups in terms of
capability to use of force in a transnational context.
(4) And finally the ability to influence law
enforcement and judicial systems; infiltrating and
manipulation capacity through direct representation in the
political system, formation of secret lobbies, and the use
of intimidation, corruption and violence.
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The evaluation of the social, political and economic
structure that the crime groups operate in, should refer
to:
(1) Social dynamics facilitating the continual
operation of organized crime groups and the impact of
organized crime in the society in turn; general economic
and social trends, the level of perception of the threat
caused by organized crime, existence of civil society
groups which could organize the reaction of the people, if
there is.
(2) The legal framework of a given country; the degree
of awareness and preparedness of state agencies to the
organized crime activities, existence and effectiveness of
special investigative rules, regulations and tools to fight
against the crime.
Research purpose and questions
Assuming transnational organized crime to be in the
context of non-traditional security threats and to try to
find ways out of the potentially explosive action, the
primary objective of this study is to assess the threat of
transnational organized crime against the rule of law in
democracies in particular and the world order in general.
At the end of the study, it is hoped that reliable analyses
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of transnational organized crime activities could be used
in formulation of policies and guidelines on effective
strategies to prevent and combat this threat.
Two main questions to be answered in this context are
first, what is the correlation between the domestic and
international political-economical environment and
organized criminal activity, especially in today`s global
world? In reverse, what are the consequences of criminal
activity on local political economies and global order?
Second, what should be the pre-conditions for a broad
response to curb this activity?
Limitations
There is considerable difficulty in framing of the
research on transnational organized crime, as could be
understood from the complexities of definitions. For this
reason, it is important to make it clear what is and is not
included in this study. To begin with, even though it is
not possible to exclude completely, terrorism will not be
emphasized. Terrorism and organized crime have intersection
points, especially in terms of drug, weapons and nuclear
materials trafficking. However, for the purpose of this
study, terrorism will be recognized as another special area
to be studied by related scholars since it has a highly
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controversial character and its recipients differ from
other types of transnational crimes. Interregional
conflicts versus transnational organized crime relationship
will be touched upon in the second section, but it will be
limited to the research related to the new trends in the
character of organized crime. There will be a discussion on
the Russian Organized Crime-related nuclear materials
trafficking matter and associated national security
threats, but the same limitations apply.
A second limitation that should be noted is rather
than concentrating on statistical information and trends
for each specific crime, the impact of transnational
organized crime as a whole on the political economies of
the countries and on the world order will be the main area
of focus. Numbers will be provided whenever it is deemed
necessary.
Methodology
As in the case of definitions, the immediate
characteristic of methodology in the field of organized
crime research is its problematic nature. For most
organized crime activities, there are simply no systematic
estimates of size. Concrete and reliable data is virtually
non-existent. This largely stems from the nature of the
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phenomenon. First, almost all aspects of the organized
crime activity are illegal. This means that few records of
transactions are maintained between parties, and those that
do exist are kept strictly secret for fearing that such
documentation could lead to criminal proceedings and
prosecution. Second, organized crime activities tend to be
covert in nature. In the case of drugs for instance, in
order to avoid detection by law enforcement agencies, drugs
are often produced in secret well-guarded locations, and
when they are transported, drugs tend to be ingeniously
concealed to avoid detection. As a result of this, drug
production & trafficking is very difficult to trace. If it
is taken into consideration that drug related crime is
almost the only organized crime field that we have rough
estimates on production, trafficking and consumption
trends, understanding the problem of data compilation would
be easier. Because, simply put, measuring other markets
that have little in common, (i.e., trafficking of human
beings, weapons or nuclear materials) it is almost
impossible. Similarly fundamental elements of organized
crime, such as corruption and violence are not subject to
estimation, to say the least.
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The secrecy of participants, the confidentiality of
materials collected by investigative agencies, and filters
or screens on the perceptive apparatus of informants and
investigators pose serious methodological problems for the
social scientist (Kelly, 1998. p.172). The secretive nature
of criminal networks` activity halts the use of many useful
instruments for gathering data; in this context, most of
the information available to law enforcement agencies and
social scientists are obtained from the participants
themselves.
Nonetheless, there are several sources of data on
organized crime and related phenomenon:
First, there are inter-governmental organizations such
as Interpol, Europol, the World Health Organization, UN
Drug Control Program and the World Customs Organization, as
well as non-governmental organizations and independent
institutes such as Paris based Observatoire Geopolitique
des Drogues, Washington based Transnational Threats
Research Center and Transparency International and numerous
foreign policy institutes engaged in transnational
organized crime related research. These provide some
statistics.
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Second, in countries that are affected by organized
crime there are usually certain state agencies responsible
for data collection and research. In the United States
there is Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), for instance. In this study the
publications of various state agencies are going to be
utilized. In spite of the fact that they present problems
of agency bias, figures of organized crime prepared by
governmental agencies focus on the criminal act and
criminal actor and tend to ignore the complicity of the
upper world in sustaining criminal activity, which results
in a bias pervading most of the research on organized crime
(Kelly, 1998.p.173). Agency-generated records are one of
the best resources of data on transnational crime research.
Third, there are some investigative records,
ethnographic studies and surveys, and informants.
Investigative records from fighting agencies may be
obtained through personal skills and connections, but these
methods have their own limitations. This method is not
employed in this study. Ethnographic studies and surveys
are good resources, and with regard to Russian Organized
Crime they will be utilized through the scarcely available
literature given on the issue. Informants could be
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recruited through an agency, or by personal contacts.
However, besides the serious question of how representative
they are of the population they allegedly belong, this
method is beyond the reach of the researcher of this study.
In this context, much of the research is library-
based, along with dependable resources from the World Wide
Web. Obviously, this started with a literature review
including academic sources from criminological books,
journals and reports, which outlined the state of knowledge
and argument in this field. In addition to the
transnational organized crime patterns, the literature
about globalization and post-communist period socio-
economic developments with relate to Russian Organized




CURRENT TRENDS IN TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
In just one decade, organized crime has gone from
being considered a problem limited to certain countries or
regions, the result of specific historical circumstances
and scarcely affecting the political decision making, to
become one of the basic factors when defining threats to
the national security in general and democratic governance
in particular (Godson & Olson, 1995). Organized crime is no
longer assessed as a problem of criminality in a given
society, but a phenomenon operating on worldwide scale,
harming the functioning of societies and politics. Although
impacts of it diverge, depending on various conditions, it
is a growing problem.
Before making an analysis on organized crime and
recent trends in its character, a question must be answered
for clarification purposes. What are the differences
between groups of people who systematically commit crimes
and what is considered to be organized crime?
Although a functional relationship is observed between
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criminal gangs and organized crime, there are two basic
differences between these concepts. As a proof for the
existence of organized crime, there must be some particular
social consequences, associated with the commitment of
offenses included by organized crime. These social impacts
might include fear, anxiety and resentment stemming from
the observance of the use of violence, the financial losses
or the disappearance of security feeling among the
citizens.
A second characteristic of organized crime draws a
sharper line between it and ordinary criminal activity: its
ability to protect itself against the state that is
theoretically the ultimate ruler in a given society. Such
protection is achieved in two ways: intimidations through
the actual use of violence or the threat of using it; and,
corruption which blocks action by state institutions or
civil society entities. Within this framework, the range of
activities that the organized crime groups may carry out is
comprehensive, the limits of which are determined by the
internal and external dynamics. The violent methods
employed by organized crime groups may reach to an extent
of terrorism, at certain times, as exampled by the drug
cartels in Colombia. However, these violent acts must not
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be confused with the activities referred to by the term
Narco-terrorism, which could be described as the engagement
of insurgent groups in drug trafficking to fund their
political activities.
It does not prove to be an exclusive one, but a wide-
ranging inventory of organized criminal activity might be
presented as follows:
(1) Supply of illegal goods and services: The
production and smuggling of drugs, trafficking of weapons,
nuclear materials, children, organs, illegal immigrants;
gambling, usury, forgery, hired killings and prostitution;
the sale of stolen property, especially luxury cars,
animals and works of art;
(2) Helping out legitimate companies and businessmen
in illegal matters such as breaking environmental or labor
laws or fraud;
(3) The use of legal networks for illicit activities
such as management of transport companies for drug
trafficking or construction investment, and establishment &
infiltration of financial institutions for the purpose of
money laundering;
(4) Systematic predatory action such as piracy,
extortion and kidnapping.
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According to the United Nations Interregional Crime
and Justice Research Institute, among the large groups
typically considered to be belonging to the category of
organized crime and to be involved in one or other of these
illicit activities mentioned above are: Colombian cartels
and Mexican organized crime groups; Nigerian and South
African groups; Chinese Triads and Japanese Yakuza; Thai
and Cambodian organized crime groups; Turkish mafia and
Albanian organized crime groups; major Italian mafia-type
organizations; and Russian organized crime groups (1999).
Post-cold war period and changing focus in
international relations
The evolution of international relations gave a new
role to the organized crime phenomenon as a growing threat
to democratic regimes. Although there is no unanimity on
the extent of organized crime as a threat, its importance
is reduced to a potential risk by some authors (Turner,
1991). Recent research has given weight to the challenges
it poses for national security.
On the one hand, the collapse of the Iron Curtain and
the deep financial and political crisis in post-communist
countries have led to the questioning of the ideas
governing the concept of national security. In this
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context, the organizations, which played major roles during
the Cold War, found themselves deprived of the theoretical
justification supplied by the existence of opposing
superpowers and nuclear threat. For instance, until the
collapse of communism in 1989, the United States had a
defining national strategy based upon the clear and present
danger of an expansionist Soviet Empire (Weinrod, 1996).
Under the changing circumstances, where the supreme threat
is no longer alive, these agencies required a new kind of
justification for their high expenditures and central
roles. They were forced to redefine themselves and their
missions. Thus, especially in the US, the Soviet Union went
from “Evil Empire” to disintegration and a safe haven for
organized crime. Communism fell behind as far as a security
concern and organized crime groups, which gained control of
large amounts of resources, especially nuclear materials
from the republics which emerged from the break up of
totalitarianism. These groups became a clear menace, as
were its counterparts in other parts of the world.
Generally speaking, this shift in focus is part of a
redefinition of the concept of national security which is
more akin now to the one existing in the period between the
two world wars than to the prevailing one during the Cold
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War. The new shift is based on the confrontation between
antagonistic blocks, geopolitical calculations and the
realistic dimension of international relations (Baldwin,
1996). With the end of the bi-polar system, different
definitions were made regarding the actors on the world
stage. Four groups (market democracies, transition states,
rogue states and failing states) unanimously became the
main actors of international relations in today`s world. A
fifth group is being accepted as non-state actors
increasingly in the international relations literature.
While global companies in this group of non-state actors
are supporting the market democracies; international
criminal syndicates prey on the markets while terrorist
organizations seek to bring the markets down and these two
groups together might be called as transnational outlaws
(Binnendijk, 1999)
The growth of globalization and its impacts
Apart from the arguments developed within the law
enforcement and intelligence communities, it has become
evident that globalization has helped organized crime in
increasing its harmful consequences on national security in
general, as well as on the normal functioning of democratic
institutions and processes in particular.
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Several factors facilitated this emerging situation
and produced a new model of organized crime predominantly
transnational in its character. This type of organized
crime has three basic differences with respect to previous
manifestations of the phenomenon: it tends to operate at
regional or global level, mobilizing extensive cross-border
connections and, above all, has the ability to challenge
both national and international authorities (Godson &
Olson, 1993).
These factors, which facilitated the economic
globalization, are also abused by the criminal
organizations in enlargement process of their activities,
in a way to perform at a broader scale, rather than being
restricted in certain countries or regions. As reported by
the United Nations Drug Control Program, transnational
criminal organizations have many similarities to
transnational corporations (1994) and both of them are
eager to adapt themselves into changing conditions to enjoy
the opportunities offered by the external environment. The
increasing economic interdependence of the world requires
both licit and illicit businesses to think internationally
(Shelley, 1995b). Just as legitimate international
corporations establish branches around the world to further
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their profits, so do illicit multinational businesses. In
this framework, it can easily be claimed that the growth in
illicit activities is parallel to the increasingly
international scope of legitimate business and the way it
is conducted.
This rapid globalization of business is mainly based
on new technologies along with the political commitment to
free market principles. First of all, the possibilities
provided by innovative technologies were applied to
transportation and led to an increase in the flow of
illicit as well as licit goods.
Between 1960 and 1974, the passenger volume on
international flights increased six fold. By 1992, it
had increased more than four times from 1974 levels.
This rise has contributed to an increasingly mobile
world population, a mobility equally enjoyed by
carriers of illicit commodities, and illegally
obtained currencies. Concomitantly, between 1970 and
1990, global trade increased ten times. Included in
the increased flow of commodities are illicit
commodities, as cargo is loaded and unloaded at
numerous points around the globe to avoid detection
(Williams, 1994, p.102).
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This situation has been acute in the field of drug
trafficking, which has proved to be the most lucrative
illicit business during the last few decades, since
producing and consuming nations have been geographically
distant from each other, or at least not sharing borders in
many cases. Although it can be claimed that cultivation or
production of certain drug types are not limited to certain
locations, (as in the case of cannabis and synthetic
drugs); for traditional hard drugs, like cocaine and
heroin, this is still the case. Criminals are eager to use
any possible means of transportation to conduct their
illicit activities. The following is a very good example in
understanding the level of this enthusiasm:
…the huge metal cylinders were not storage tanks at
all - they were sections of a submarine.  Once
completed, it could have ferried some 150 tons of
cocaine to the United States and elsewhere with almost
no risk of being detected. Colombian and American law
enforcement officials swarmed in on helicopters to
investigate and also to marvel at the sheer audacity
of the scheme: to build a submarine 8,000 feet high in
the Andes Mountains and then, presumably, truck it at
least 210 miles to the ocean, section by section.
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Among papers police found was a list of handwritten
words in Russian and their Spanish equivalents.  The
Russian angle was not entirely a surprise to the
investigators. Russian mobsters are increasing their
operations in Colombia, especially in drug - and
gunrunning.  Several years ago, Colombian drug lords
even tried to obtain a Russian military submarine from
corrupt Russian officials, using a go-between in the
United States (Colombian, 2000, p.7).
The growth in world trade has been aggravated by a
remarkable technological progress in communications and
revolution in financial networks. Satellite technology, the
innovation of fiber-optic cable, complex computers and
advances in Internet has resulted in a worldwide
communication explosion, which is hardly controllable. This
technological progress in communications is not only
employed in a direct manner by criminal organizations in
their operations, but also is abused for the money
laundering purposes. Huge amounts of money, derived from
illicit activities in circulation within the system are
transferred at high speed concealing its illegitimate
origin and ownership. The general lack of supervision of
international financial activities, along with the
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complexity of such operations makes it extremely difficult
to enforce regulations. Actually, these activities are
carried out on a large scale in many countries which are
chosen according to factors such as banking secrecy and
facilities to operate with, tax havens, corruption levels,
police training, the power of financial institutions and
the currency exchange controls (Maingot, 1995).
Organized crime groups are than law enforcement
agencies in adopting the latest technology in their
operations.
The cartels are ahead of us a lot of the time in
having state-of-the-art technology because they can
just go out and spend what it takes as soon as it is
available. We have to get contracts, take bids, and
get approval. The drug traffickers can also intercept
telephone calls, set up electronic surveillance inside
of trucks and encrypt their cellular phone calls so
that they cannot be decoded by law enforcement
authorities (Macko, 1997, p.1).
Technological progress and the information
revolution also have effects on the structure of
criminal syndicates allowing them to operate in
networks. This leads to more flexibility allowing them
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to maximize profits and evade the government forces.
It also serves to decrease the paperwork and eliminate
incriminating evidence.
The last thing to be stressed as facilitating the
transnational crime activities under the framework of
globalism is the emergence of large, cosmopolitan global
cities besides the already existent ones. The cities are
connected to one another by telecommunications and
transportation links and serve as safe havens for criminal
organizations. The alienating conditions and social and
economic problems within the many mega-cities force the
inhabitants to form criminal social organizations such as
street gangs in order to survive. Global metropolises
become the incubators for these gangs to develop into
powerful transnational criminal organizations. Cities not
only aid transnational crime development but also sustain
them by becoming congenial environments providing
anonymity, encouraging survival skills, promoting bonding
mechanisms, thereby facilitating the success of criminal
organizations and increasing the opportunities for the
establishment of connections among criminal groups
(Williams, 1997b).
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Establishment of diaspora networks
Financial burdens push people to search for new
alternatives; interregional conflicts make life virtually
impossible to live for civilians in their homelands; and
the progress made in transportation have led to an
important increase in immigration flows and the gradual
creation of Diaspora (dispersion of any originally
homogeneous people) networks throughout the globe. In spite
of the fact that most of the immigrants are respectful to
the laws of the host countries, criminal organizations have
taken advantage of these ethnic people so as to develop
their own transnational networks within which they are in
permanent contact through advanced communications systems.
Asian and Latin American people in the United States,
Turkish groups living in European countries, and Albanian
nationals immigrated to the USA and the Western European
countries mainly for political and humanitarian reasons are
good examples of this problem. The precarious living
conditions of many immigrants, the identity crisis they
face and discriminative attitudes in the host countries
make these people easy targets for criminal groups who
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share the same national identity with them and who promise
for a better and secure life.
By 1994, Greek authorities estimated that between 600
and 1500 Albanians crossed the border illegally, each
day. Many of the Albanians, young males in their
twenties and thirties, usually unskilled laborers,
often found little or no employment in Greece. This
resulted in many of them roaming the streets, engaged
in criminal activity, like their Albanian counterparts
who fled to Greece, many of the refugees were young,
unemployed males, put out of work when hundreds of
state-run factories were closed down. Bitter,
resentful, and willing to do anything for wages, these
men were ideal candidates for organized crime groups
(Xhodo, 1996, p.5).
Attempts to control or curb the activities of Diaspora
networks seems futile due to the fact that infiltration
into these groups is almost impossible. Police intervention
among these groups is hindered by language and cultural
barriers, which are strengthened by kinship ties leading to
group solidarity and suspicion of national authorities
(Savona, 1996). Another problem with the Diaspora networks
of the mafia groups originating from the transition or
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failing states is, unless the chaos and the anarchy is
terminated in their homelands, the human resources for this
foreign-land extensions will never expire. These networks
will go on attracting more and people who are extremely
disappointed with the economic and social problems they
suffer and who lose their faith in the systems of their
countries.
Interregional conflicts
Under normal conditions organized crime prefers
stability, however it tends to prosper when there is
political and economic unrest. In this context,
interregional political conflicts have provided organized
crime groups a fertile area to operate and maximizing their
profits. With the end of the cold war and the ironic
worldwide stability it presented by creating a bi-polar
world; hundreds of ethnic and small-scale ideological
conflicts have boomed in many regions around the globe
contributing to transnational organized crime. Equipped
with high communication and transportation skills combined
with a strong desire for higher profits, criminal groups
have infiltrated the unstable areas where there is an
obvious loosening of controls. Some events in recent years
have been particularly relevant for transnational criminal
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groups, such as the Yugoslavian civil war (Xhodo, 1996).
High tensions have turned into armed conflicts at times in
the Caucasian Republics of Russia and Tajikistan.
Fall of iron curtain and its implications
The collapse of the communist bloc has had deep
impacts on the worldwide crime. Since 1989, Central and
Eastern European Countries, along with the ex-USSR nations
(both Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members and
non-CIS members) have been undergoing a process of
fundamental political, social and economic transformation.
These changes have been accompanied by major economic,
social and political problems including unemployment and
declining living standards. The transition from a planned
centralized financial system to free market economies has
provided new incentives and opportunities for crime.
Uncertain economic conditions, weak law enforcement,
inadequate laws, unprotected borders, vulnerable financial
systems and a traditional underground criminal activity
bolstered the rapid rise of organized crime. The power
vacuum emerged due to the termination of strict internal
controls once used during the reign of totalitarian regimes
and was quickly filled by organized crime groups, which
were the most prepared social establishments in place. This
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has had extraordinary and very harmful consequences for the
future development of these states as well as for the
consolidation of pluralistic regimes. The triumph of
capitalism has led to the troubled establishment of free
market mechanisms without the accompanying control
measures; a weak or un-existing civil society, and a
peculiar political culture facilitated this. This change
has initially led to internal disorder; the demise of
previous authority structures, reluctance on the part of
the population to new official control, the revival of
ethnic antagonisms, and a collapse in the judiciary and
security agencies, often entailing their subordination to
or cooperation with organized crime (Douglass, 1995). As
stated above, the vacuum of power and a previous history of
organized crime, which supplied the human resources and the
required social networks, together with the progressive
fall in the living standards have provided excellent
conditions for recreating, establishing and expanding large
criminal groups. Of all these activities, the greatest
threat to regional and global security is perhaps
trafficking in radioactive materials, which might fall into
the hands of terrorist organizations or uncontrollable
states. However, evidence of such traffic is still scarce
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and in some cases has been manipulated by the intelligence
services and the media (Raine & Cillufo, 1994).
Russian Organized Crime is specifically examined in
this research because it is the ultimate model of Post-
communist organized crime due to its explosive character
both in domestic and transnational levels, the concrete
threat it poses against the rule of law in a given country,
and the challenge to national security and law enforcement
of democratic nations. It is believed that, diverse
implications of modern transnational crime will be detailed
more effectively in this way.
On the whole, all the factors reviewed helped to
expand of transnational organized crime. As a result,
organized crime constitutes a growing threat to national
security and international instability can disrupt social
institutions and economic development, has the ability to
undermine democratic processes, and victimizes entire
populations. Thus, a traditional problem of public order or
internal security has become a challenge which could not
only endanger the viability of societies, the independence
of governments, the integrity of financial institutions or




ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME ON
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES:
THE RUSSIAN CASE STUDY
Introduction to Russian organized crime
It`s wonderful that the Iron Curtain is gone, but it
was a shield for the West. Now, we have opened the
gates, and this is very dangerous for the world.
America is getting Russian criminals: Europe is
getting Russian criminals. They`ll steal everything.
They`ll occupy Europe. Nobody will have the resources
to stop them. You people in the West don`t know our
mafia yet; you will, you will (Sterling, 1994. p. 22).
Transnational organized crime groups have received
increasing attention from law enforcement agencies,
intelligence communities, and researchers around the world
beginning in the 1990s due to several reasons explained in
previous chapter. However, there have been many differences
in terms of the interpretation and assessment of the
character of Russian organized crime.
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Some sources called it as The New Ivan the Terrible
(Vassalo, 1996. p.24), others compared its explosion to a
criminal revolution (Maximenkov & Namiesniowski, 1994).
Statements of Russia`s top politicians and the views of
U.S. officials fueled the already on rise worldwide concern
such as Boris Yeltsin`s announcements:
Organized Crime is destroying the economy,
interfering in politics, undermining public morals,
threatening individual citizens and the entire Russian
nation…our country is already considered a great mafia
power (Ryan & Rush, 1997. p.174).
We have become a mafia state on a world scale
(Ryan & Rush, 1997. p.174).
Gorbachev`s former senior advisor Yuri Maltsev
stated:
Russia has become the criminal capital of the
world. In Russia today, the organized mafia and the
government are the one and the same thing. They are
two hands of the same ruling elite (Grigg, 1996. p.4).
Senator John Kerry was quoted to say:
Russian Organized Crime is the new communism, the
new monolithic threat (Grigg, 1996. p.4).
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FBI director, Louis Freeh made public:
Russian Organized Crime is the greatest long-term
threat to the security of the United States -(Center
for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 1997.
p.17)
So what is Russian organized crime? In line with the
aims of this study, brief information on its size, scope
and evolution are provided below. Then, in the following
section, its domestic and transnational effects and impacts
on the functioning of democracy in Russia and in other
countries will be detailed.
Structure, size and scope
The official definition of Russian organized crime
(ROC) offered by Russian law enforcement authorities is: an
organized community of criminals ranging in size from 50 to
1000 persons, which is engaged in systematic criminal
business and protects itself from the law with the help of
corruption (CSIS, 1997. p.24).
Although there is no set structure for a ROC group,
the following classification, is probably the most
comprehensive one for the larger groups:
-Leader, with excellent contacts in industry, national
and local governments, etc.
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-Deputies of various sections-strategist, economic
adviser, banking, consultant, industry specialists, heads
of racketeering, drug smuggling, security, counter-
intelligence etc.
-Team leaders-accountants, bankers, car traders,
extortionists etc.
-Soldiers-smugglers, bodyguards, pimps, hitmen, etc.
In addition, most major gangs share the following
characteristics:
-A hierarchy enforced by strict disciplinary sanctions
-Restricted membership, sometimes based on family or
ethnic ties
-Tight secrecy and compartmentalization
-The uninhibited use of intimidation and violence
(Dunn, 1997).
Contrary to the common illustration of the Russian
Mafia as a monolithic organization, ROC groups cannot be
assessed as centralized entities. Furthermore, the Russian
Mafia is not exclusively Russian, it is highly diverse and
fractured, with ethnic divisions and divisions based on
control of territory and sector.
According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs,
there are several thousand criminal groups on Russian
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territory, and these are organized in 150 large
organizations. 275 groups have inter-regional connections
and 170 have international ties (Wessell, 1995b. p.30). As
many as 120,000 people are believed to be active members of
these gangs, though other resources estimate that more than
three million people may be involved.
Operations of these groups comprise almost all aspects
of organized crime, which distinguish ROC from the other
major criminal organizations of the world. The list goes
from counterfeiting, drug and arms smuggling, extortion,
kidnapping, prostitution, smuggling and exporting of raw
materials, control of many hotels, casinos and restaurants,
smuggling automobiles, piracy, production and sale of
contraband tobacco and alcohol to smuggling of illegal
immigrants to contract killings and highly sophisticated
financial crimes.
ROC is believed to be operating in anywhere from 44 to
58 countries (CSIS, 1997), either in cooperation with other
foreign partners, or independently. While transitional
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe proved to be the
initial operation fields, all European countries have been
influenced by ROC. ROC groups expanded their activities
overseas; Israel, Canada and the United States have been
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the principal targets in this new conquest. ROC groups
outside the country also comprise a collection of gangs and
smaller groupings, some based around ethnic identities,
others on territories, and loosely linked to one of the
major groupings in Russia. This might mean ROC is open to
conflict and disorganization, but it also means flexibility
and survivability. Russian groups operating beyond Russian
borders tend to specialize in one or more of key
activities: drugs trafficking, money laundering, capital
flight, fraud and drug smuggling (Galeotti, 1997).
Evolution
Another prevalent but mistaken perception about ROC is
that it first appeared as a result of perestroika and
glasnost. Russia has a long history of having a criminal
underworld. Societies of smugglers, thieves and highwaymen
existed on the margins of national life for centuries
(Handelman, 1994). In Tsarist era, criminal gangs once were
seen as symbols of struggle against the repressive state
and its collaborators. In the pre-communist Bolshevik
movements, the revolutionary fathers encouraged the
banditism, which was seen as a way to collect the required
funds. However, after the establishment of Communist order,
all forms of banditism and gangsterism were forbidden
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resulting in the formation of one of the most clandestine
criminal organizations ever. During the communist years, a
variety of criminal groups appeared that have been given
the name of vory v zakone, which could be translated as
thieves-in-law. The vory are the most sophisticated
professional criminals, and their chiefs are the closest
things to the Godfather figures. These groups varied in
size, had a leader, and had rules of behavior for their
members. Mentioned rules form an unofficial behavior code
between these criminals, which is commonly referred as
“thieves` code”.
A thief is bound by the “thieves` code” to:
(1) Forsake his relatives--mother, father, brothers, and
sisters.
(2) Not have a family of his own -- no wife, no
children; this does not however, preclude him from having
a lover.
(3) Never, under any circumstances work, no matter how
much difficulty this brings-, live only on means gleaned
from thievery.
(4) Help other thieves -- both by moral and material
support, utilizing the commune of thieves.
(5) Keep secret information about the whereabouts of
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accomplices (i.e. dens, districts, hideouts, safe
apartments, etc.).
(6) In unavoidable situations (if a thief is under
investigation) to take the blame for someone else's
crime; this buys the other person time of freedom.
(7) Demand a convocation of inquiry for the purpose of
resolving disputes in the event of a conflict between
oneself and other thieves, or between thieves.
(8) If necessary, participate in such inquiries.
(9) Carry out the punishment of the offending thief as
decided by the convocation.
(10) Not resist carrying out the decision of punishing
the offending thief who is found guilty, with punishment
determined by the convocation.
(11) Have good command of the thieves' jargon.
(12) Not gamble without being able to cover losses.
(13) Teach the trade to young beginners.
(14) Have, if possible, informants from the rank and file
of thieves.
(15) Not lose your reasoning ability when using alcohol.
(16) Have nothing to do with the authorities
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(particularly with the ITU [Correctional Labor
Authority], not participate in public activities, nor
join any community organizations.
(17) Not take weapons from the hands of authorities; not
serve in the military.
(18) Make good on promises given to other thieves
(Lungren, 1996. p.4).
Roots of vory are generally traced to Soviet prison
system, where they have spent most of their life and
established networks among themselves. There are an
estimated 600 vory in the Soviet Union, with approximately
200 of them in Russia (Williams, 1997a. p.197). These
groups stole for financial profit but had no political
protection. It remained until the full development of the
communist state, through the development of the political
and economic system of the 1960s Soviet society, for
syndicated crime to emerge as a pattern that took hold and
continues today (Ryan & Rush, 1997).
During 1960s, particularly under the rule of Brezhnev,
Soviet State reduced the production and supply of goods and
services and diverted the investment into the science and
military establishment to strengthen its position. However,
since in the communist system there is no provider of goods
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and services but the state, the basic necessities for life
left unmet and many goods and services became legally
unavailable. In the 1960s, the Soviet citizens at all
levels began to create their own manner of obtaining the
goods and services that often constituted the basic
necessities of life that made living easier and more
pleasant (Ryan & Rush, 1997). In this picture, vory v
zakone gained importance in socio-economic life, as the
most structured and experienced civil society group to meet
the people`s demands. However since the state owned all
goods and services and was the sole employer of the whole
nation, these thugs needed to build connections within the
political elite, for basically stealing from the state.
What was important during this period was the formation of
direct alliances between organized criminal groups and the
political elite. The criminals became suppliers of
commodities and the political elite offered the sponsorship
(Sweet, 2000. p.16). The entire Soviet economy has been
nothing else but an enormous black market of goods,
services, official positions and privileges (Timofeyev,
1990).
This interaction between the criminals and the
politicians went on intensely until the second half of the
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1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power as the General
Secretary of the Soviet Union. By that time the Soviet
people had already got used to the corrupt practices, which
had been a part of their lives. Gorbachev, convinced that
the tremendous economic problems his country faced could be
solved by increased productivity, attacked a historical
problem, alcoholism, which had been a severe and acute
problem in the Russian labor force. However, his anti-
alcohol campaign limited alcohol’s availability and led to
enormous profits for organized criminals and their
collaborators in the governing mechanism. Gorbachev`s step
to stop his country`s economic breakdown was privatization,
which seemed as a way to create financial resources needed.
The historical step of Gorbachev, an important part of his
reform package aiming to establish a free market democracy
that led to the well-known developments of 1989-1991, led
to the collapse of communism and the USSR and presented
another opportunity for the expansion of organized crime.
The only people who had money to buy the state-owned
enterprises were the organized criminals (non-Russians were
allowed to buy maximum 49 percent of an establishment in a
conglomerate with Russian nationals) who had strong
connections within the government mechanism and so-called
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“nomenklatura”, the ex-communist party elite.
Privatization, definitely established as an economic
program in 1992, became the ultimate shakeout of a
bureaucratically corrupt system (Rosner, 1993. p.2). At
this point, it is crucial to remember that the system
changed its name from communism to democracy, but most of
the people from the old regime saved their places in the
government. Already fat from their corrupt practices during
the communist period, they were quick to start looting
Russia hand in hand with their partners in organized crime,
under the mask of privatization. The transition period,
beginning with the fall of the Soviet Union in August of
1991, carrying a great deal of political, economic and
social disability, has accelerated their continued
development, which will be detailed in the following
section.
Impact of organized crime on democracies:
Erosion of the sovereignty of the states
Organized crime does not function uniformly and it does
have a changing degree of impact on state mechanisms throughout
the world; due to the diversified, complex and multidimensional
character it bears, as well as the differences between the
socio-political systems it operates in. However, there is a
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common political impact of organized crime, which is acute in
the case of ROC, that is related to sovereignty which is an age-
old concept dominating the realm of relations between the
states. The frontiers separating the states do not only divide
up territory, but also different legal systems and political
economies. Transnational organized criminal groups, literally,
operate in a transnational manner with their illegal nature and
do not have any respect for borders as far as their illegal
businesses concerned. It is a fact that, economic globalization,
emerging supra-national structures and a common political
tendency towards greater freedom and the free movement of goods
and services has eroded it to a certain level, but state
monopoly over these activities is still an essential aspect of
sovereignty. Briefly, organized crime manages to escape from the
principle of territorial control, which is inseparable from the
state and corrodes the idea of national sovereignty in a
considerable manner.
Transnational operations of ROC constitute a very good
example to this. After Russia, the initial incursion into
foreign territories was ex-Soviet and ex-Warsaw countries. In
regard to activities of ROC in these countries, Galeotti
maintains that the Russian mafia has actively colonized the
underworld of other Post-Soviet states, encouraging local
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criminality, undermining the sovereignty of these new nations
and jeopardizing efforts to create stable democratic governments
(1997, p.111). Carrying a similar background and same socio-
economic problems of the transformation and having impotent law
enforcement, these countries were easy targets. One-third of the
serious crimes reported in Poland in 1992 were attributed to the
Russian mafia, while the same year one thousand CIS
(Commonwealth of Independent States, a loose version of Soviet
Union) citizens were arrested in Hungary (Handelman, 1995). In
Sofia, Bulgarian police reported that it was virtually
impossible to open a business without paying protection money to
Russian gangsters (Handelman, 1995). Later, they marched into
Germany and other countries in Western Europe. Berlin soon
became a major source of revenue for ROC groups involved in
prostitution, drug smuggling, car theft, extortion, drug related
offenses, currency counterfeiting and the trade in arms and
radioactive materials. It is estimated that Russian criminals
are responsible for one-third of all crimes in Germany (Dunn,
1997). They are in the prostitution business in all of Europe,
and Switzerland, Britain and Austria have been their bases for
money laundering operations.
The Middle East could not escape from this nightmare,
either. The Greek part of Cyprus has been a popular spot for
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money laundering, by 1996 about 1.3 billion dollars was
estimated to arrive in Cyprus from Russia every month (Williams,
1997a. p.82). Taking advantage of the “Right of Return” law,
thousands of Russian Jews and made-up Jews through false
documents entered into Israel after the collapse of the
communism, reminiscent of the early immigration wave of Russian
Jews into the US. Aggravated with the fact that Israel lacks of
effective laws against organized crime and money laundering, ROC
groups easily infiltrated into this country among the ordinary
Russian Jews. Galeotti (1997) claims that since 1996 ROC groups
have been waging a bloody war against local gangs and they
appear to be winning. Turning Israel into a money laundering
safe heaven was the most significant activity, however. Israeli
Police officials estimate that Russian mobsters have poured more
than $4 billion dollars of dirty money into Israel`s economy,
though some estimates range as high as $20 billion (Friedman,
2000. p.278).
Next came the United States, a country with a large
Russian émigré community. At the end of four main
immigration flows (late 1890s, early 1900s, late 1970s and
from late 1980s until today) approximately 300.000 Russians
chose the US as their new residence, not to mention
thousands of illegal ones (Finckenauer & Waring, 1998). Of
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course, criminals who establish the American leg of ROC
managed to leak into the land of opportunities among these
immigrants, especially with the third and fourth waves.
Unlike in Europe, their main concentration has been white-
collar crime. O`Neal (2000) stated that sophisticated ROC
fraud schemes in the USA include fuel scams, health care
frauds, bank fraud and stock market manipulation. According
to a National Law Enforcement Survey, respondents from 23
states described Russian émigré crime as organized crime on
their territories (Finckenauer & Waring, 1998).
In August 1994, Canadian authorities issued an
intelligence report that concluded that murder, shootings,
criminal rackets, extortion and intimidation generated by
ROC have occurred on Canada soil (Maximenkov &
Namiesniowski, 1994).
According to a CSIS report on Russian Organized Crime
(1997), there are indications that ROC is becoming active
in Latin America and the Caribbean. In August 1995,
knowledgeable sources advised the task force that several
Chechen groups had set up a criminal infrastructure in
Argentina and they already are reported to be engaged
actively in extortion and are thought to be extremely
violent.
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As clearly seen from examples above, ROC groups have
diligently pursued criminal activities by violating the
political boundaries of sovereign states. In sum, their
most profitable transnational operations included:
(1) The theft of automobiles from European countries,
and the subsequent black market resale of the vehicles in
Russia. In some cases, this activity includes re-stealing
these vehicles in Russia and selling them especially in
Central Asian ex-Soviet republics.
(2) The extortion of Russian émigré businessmen living
in foreign countries.
(3) The contract killings in foreign lands, mostly
arising from inter-gang disputes.
(4) The facilitation of shipments of narcotic drugs
between producer countries in Latin America, Golden
Triangle and Golden Crescent countries and consumers in the
United States and Europe.
(5) Running illegal prostitution rings
(6) The laundering of illegal profits through shell
companies, real estate investments, and bank accounts.
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Interference in the political cultures
The standard definition of political culture may be
accepted as the attitudes, beliefs, values and skills that
are current in an entire population, as well as those
special propensities and patterns that may be found within
separate parts of that population (Almond & Powell, 1966.
p.23). In this context, organized crime essentially affects
the political culture and social and physical environments
of institutions in a society by blurring the lines that
separate what is legal from what is illegal, generating
alternative loyalties to the state and provoking changes in
public opinion with negative effects on the functioning of
the system.
Blurring the lines between legal and illegal
It is widely accepted that moral values of the Russian
society was systemically corroded by the practices in the
communist period, especially during and following the
Brezhnev years, due to the explosion of black market
activities. A Russian economist Nkolai Shmelev describes a
Soviet Union that in the 1980s was plagued by massive
apathy, indifference, theft and disrespect for honest
labor, together with aggressive envy toward those who earn
more-even by honest methods; …”There is lack of belief in
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the officially announced objectives and purposes, in the
very possibility of a more rational organization of social
and economic life” (Finckenauer & Waring, 1998. p.84). An
ex-Soviet citizen was reported to say lying and stealing
were normal for Soviet citizens because people stole from a
government that was cheating them (Finckenauer & Waring,
1998. p.82).
By the time the Soviet Empire was collapsing, the
Soviet society was also going down and the distrust of the
system was at its peak. Although the revolutions of 1989-
1991 periods created an optimistic atmosphere in the
society towards a better future in socio-economic and
political terms, deeper disillusion was on its way to
replace these positive feelings. Not long after the
proclamation of the victory of capitalism and free market
democracy; honest citizens in Russia watched the
penetration of the alliance of the former party elite,
members of the law enforcement community, and the organized
criminals into all legal and illegal sectors. Contrary to
the expectations toward the emergence of a middle class,
which is the vital element needed for the very existence of
a democratic system, polarization of the society with a
small extremely rich elite and a large impoverished
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population has been the reality. According to the data
provided by Ryvkina (1998), the proportion of those living
at or below the subsistence minimum was 75-80 percent in
Russia, in 1998. She further argues that the antisocial
strata, which have multiplied beyond imagination, are
producing an anti-social morality and spreading it not only
within their own environment but also throughout society
(Ryvkina, 1998).
The endemic corruption, hijacking of the privatization
process by the former party elite and plundering of the
state treasury contributed to the loss of legitimacy of the
governing mechanism in the eyes of the public who is
dealing with deep economic problems. It also accelerated
the process of moral degradation and created a sense of
admiration to the thieves and their collaborators who seems
to be the only organized group in a collapsing society.
Changing values, especially among the youth can be
exemplified in the following statement of a young girl
living in Moscow: “It used to be fashionable to have an
artist, a rock singer, or even a journalist for a
boyfriend. Now the attractive girls want mafiya boys”
(Handelman, 1995.p.26). Finckenauer reported that most of
the young people he interviewed in Georgia, which is an ex-
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Soviet republic, stated that being a vory is the aspiration
of most of the young boys and they are attracted to this
particular mafia business because they have authority and
command respect (Finckenauer & Waring, 1998).
The disappointment of the people and the loss of
respect of the politicians can be best summarized in the
words of the Chairman of the Municipal Legal Commission of
the Moscow City Council: “I compare our people to a
deceived woman sitting by herself in the kitchen, abandoned
by all her lovers. We were screwed by President Yeltsin, by
Luzkhov, by Popov.. al of them, and they don`t care what
happens to us now” (Handelman, 1995. p.147).
Provoking changes in public opinion
“We spoke of the many absurdities of our life and came
to the conclusion we just couldn`t go on like this”, told
Eduard Sheverdnadhze, well-known ex-Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the communist USSR, on the breakup of Soviet
Union (Kullberg & Zimmerman, 1999. p.332). In the eyes of
the Russian citizens, the collapse of communism was a true
revolution, it was going to mean more freedom, respect for
human rights and a free market economy; everybody was tired
of hundreds of years of the iron fist of authoritarian
regimes. However, only after two years of so-called
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democracy and capitalism, the tendencies of the people
began to change. This change in attitudes was reflected in
three parliamentary elections held after the end of
communism in 1991. The Communist Party of Russia went
through a renaissance, which has a clear anti-western and
anti-reform attitude, gained 12.40 percent of the votes in
1993, 1995 election results stunned even the communists.
With an almost one hundred percent increase, Russian
Communist Party enlarged its share to 22.30 percent. It
increased its power in 1999 elections, 24.29 percent of the
votes were used in favor of Communist Party. Currently it
is the biggest power in Russian Duma, holding 124 seats out
of 225.
On the other hand, Vladimir Zhirinovsky`s Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia, which is the biggest
representative of ultra-nationalist anti-western right wing
in Russian Politics came first far ahead of other parties
with a 22.92 percentage rate in 1993 elections. It scored
11.18 percent in 1995 and 6.40 percent in 1999 elections.
This party`s share in the cake seems to be declining, but
it still holds 19 seats in Duma (State Committee of Russian
Federation on Statistics, 1999).
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Authoritarian regimes of the past, both Czarism and
Communism at least kept order, delivered some of the
necessities of life, and brought an international respect
to Russia, and for ordinary citizens, the reform period
only meant the reverse; anarchy, starvation and
humiliation. That is the underlying reason why communist
and fascist parties enjoy such a considerable support from
the Russian people.
Breaking up the cohesion within the population
Organized crime can and does lead to a national
identity crisis within the countries where different
nationalities co-exist in cases where a particular
territory or ethnic group has a significantly greater level
of organized criminal activity than others. A feeling of
rejection can arise in certain segments of the less
affected areas. In the worse case scenarios, problems of
xenophobia may arise leading to extreme right-wing violence
and social strife. The generalization of accusations
against culturally different communities produces a breakup
of the social cohesion, which is essential for the survival
of democracy. In case that actions against the organized
crime activity is confused with attacks on cultural
backgrounds, the law-abiding members of the mentioned
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minority groups, even their motherlands might feel tempted
to resort aggressive nationalistic feelings as reaction.
The current demonization of the Chechens in Russian
Federation stands as a clear testimony. Activities of
Chechen criminal syndicates are astonishing, however when
it is taken into account that total population of Chechnya
is less than 1 million, out of the almost 150 million
people living in Russian Federation, it is ridiculous to
attribute most of the organized crime activity to these
people. According to Wessel (1995b), the term persons of
Caucasian nationality was born recently, and all possible
sins began to be attributed to these people, above all,
they were blamed for the skyrocketing crime rate. Amnesty
International, the most prominent international human
rights organization, urged the Mayor of Moscow to publicly
clarify his statement regarding the persecution of the
Chechen Diaspora in Moscow, and to condemn unequivocally
any illegal practices by law. The program, Segodnya, on 12
July 1996 showed Mayor Luzhkov having the following
conversation with a high-ranking police officer present on
the site:
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Mayor: Now we have to take actions. We have to take
all of them out of Moscow. Everyone. The whole
diaspora.
Police officer: Well, if you only allow us -- I will
certainly introduce terror on the streets.
Mayor: Yes. The whole Chechen diaspora -- out of here.
Police officer: It's about time we did that,
Mayor Yury Luzhkov: We have warned them many times...
(Amnesty International [AI], 1997)
Even though this conversation took place in 1996,
Moscow police, particularly special duty OMON unit was
reported to conduct frequent document checks, particularly
of persons who are dark-skinned or who appear to be from
the Caucasus until today. Police and other security forces
in various parts of the country continued their practice of
targeting citizens from the Caucasus and darker-skinned
persons in general for arbitrary searches and detention on
the pretext of fighting crime and enforcing residential
registration requirements (United States Department of
State [USDS], 2000)
Chechens were immediately proclaimed to be behind the
mass bombings, which happened in Moscow in 1999, murdering
130 people. No Chechen was found to be in connection with
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these activities in further investigations, but serious
allegations were unleashed about the involvement of the
Russian Secret Service into these terrorist attacks in
terms of creating public support for the heavy clashes
between Russian government forces and Chechen guerrillas in
Chechnya. However, the government`s campaign was
successful; nobody seemed to care about the allegations and
public support for Russian intervention skyrocketed. As
some observers noted, most of the Russian crime lords
welcomed the move as a way of eliminating their biggest
competitors. The secret discrimination among the Russian
people against Chechens took different shapes as well.
Again, in the USDS report it was maintained that Chechens
face great difficulty in finding lodging in Moscow and
frequently are forced to pay at least twice the usual rent
for an apartment, while a similar pattern of discrimination
exists against persons from the Caucasus in St. Petersburg
(USDS, 2000).
The transnational activities of organized crime groups
may also produce a negative reaction against the minority
groups they belong. The following statement of an American
police detective, excerpted from Handelman`s work (2000),
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highlights how the alienation begins between the criminally
active émigré populations and the local people.
“Why are we being victimized by non-citizens who can
run to Israel or Russia and can`t be extradited? The
Russian gangsters have told me that they`ve come here
to suck our country dry. My uncle died on the beaches
of Normandy defending this country. How did the
Russian mob become so entrenched? They are into Social
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid fraud. Why is that
every ambulance service in Brooklyn is run by Russian
mob? Why are so many of their doctors practicing
without a license? They have invaded Wall Street from
boiler-room operations to broker-age houses. Nothing
is too small for them to steal. Even the guys with the
multi-million dollar Medicare scam still have to have
their food stamps. The first generation is all
thieves”.
Parallel systems of justice and social mechanisms
Parallel systems of justice, created by organized
crime groups, which do not require a single authority or
specific regulations, exercise important missions. They
basically regulate the social and economic relations of
organization members that would be described to be serving
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as an internal legal system, and to some extent they apply
to relations with the rival organizations and people who do
not cooperate.
These parallel systems of justice, which could be
named as private justice systems can and do have some
alternative norms and violence stands as the most prominent
one. The widespread use of violence can lead to instability
and alarm in the society, and this situation may worsen
because of the inability of the government to curb this
tendency.
Information indicating the incidence of violence
related to ROC is fearsome. There were 562 contract murders
in Russia in 1994, compared with 289 in 1993 and 102 in
1992. Of the 562 murder victims that year, 185 were
criminal figures from the Russian underworld and 177 were
businessmen (CSIS, 1997. p.41). Shelley (1996) says almost
none of the hundreds of contract killings perpetrated by
organized crime groups throughout Russia have been solved
by the time she completed her article.
According to State Committee of Russian Federation on
Statistics (1999), in 1996 29,400,in 1997 29,300 and in
1998 29,600 crimes were reported as felonious homicides and
attempts to kill. There is no information on hand about the
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percentage of ROC involvement in these crimes but it would
not be wrong to assume that organized criminal actions hold
a considerable portion. One Russian citizen commented to
Shelley (1996, p. 122):
“Everyone in Russia is extremely afraid of them, and
they have all the power. They don`t even have to say
they will kill you. You just know it. “
Since the protection of the citizens and maintaining
public safety is a primary obligation of the state; the
institutional machinery may delegitimize in the eyes of the
public which is the case for Russia.
Effects on the judiciary
Private justice systems have well-defined aims, such
as restricting competition, respect for the hierarchy,
subduing people and so on, but they do not aim to replace
with the state legal system in total. For organized
criminal groups, whose main aim is profit maximization,
justice for everyone would not be economically feasible and
prove to be pointless. They prefer to take advantage of
both justice systems in a case-to-case manner. The official
judicial power, which supposedly has legitimacy and
coercive forces is cooperated whenever needed, through
intimidation and corruption. Judges are subject to physical
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intimidation and bribery and have been murdered in Moscow,
Irkutsk, and Yekaterinburg (USDS, 2000). The financial
disparity between criminal groups and state facilitates
corruption and penetration:
Sometimes payoffs are even more direct. In Moscow,
$50,000 can stall a criminal investigation. The
Russian judiciary faces similar temptations. In cases
involving the oligarchs, trial and appellate court
judges are routinely bribed. Failing that, judges who
evince a dangerous predisposition to impartiality are
reassigned without explanation by superiors who are
presumably on the take (Wolosky, 2000, p.28).
Low salaries and falling prestige make it difficult to
attract talented new judges and contribute to the
vulnerability of existing judges to bribery and corruption.
In July 1997, President Yeltsin ordered a 65 percent pay
rise in an attempt to attract new judges to fill
approximately 1,500 vacancies in the judiciary (USDS,
2000).
Observing that financial power plays a more and more
of a determinant role in judicial resolutions, people, who
are not directly linked to the organized crime, would feel
an obligation to apply to this method, whenever they have
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something to do with the court. Other people, who would
feel complete disappointment with the system, facing the
daily violation of rights and liberties, could tend to hire
private armies to substitute the security and justice they
need, if they could so afford. It could aggravate the
violence by encouraging the other groups and individuals,
who have the needed economical power, to use the same
methods for resolution of the conflicts and building
security and an eventual militarization of the society and
shattering of the social structure may follow this.
Ineffective law enforcement has spurred the rapid
growth and expansion of the private security firms,
25,000 Russian security firms were established,
employing between 600,000-800,000 workers. The Mafia
controls at least one-sixth of them (Lindberg, 2000,
p.2). The individuals working in security bodies
comprised of former law enforcement, security and
military personnel do not just protect business but




Organized crime has numerous negative influences on
judicial mechanisms; and legislative and executive branches
of the governing mechanism are not free from manipulation,
either. To continue their illicit activities in a secure
way, criminal groups need to pervert the political system
in order to place it at their service. ROC prevents the
candidacy of people clash with their aims through
intimidation and they corrupt the representatives elected
by the people at both executive and legislative level.
Further they threaten violence against those who are not
willing to cooperate or use the media in-collaboration or
directly-controlled against or favor of the politicians and
existing and draft legislations. These are some of the
prominent tactics employed by the organized criminal
groups. The more the interests of organized crime intersect
with legislation creation and execution, the more
innovative techniques are employed.
ROC has been a constant force in shaping Russian
politics. The inability of the Russian government to combat
organized crime leads to a governing crisis itself and that
the corrupt government leaders are themselves components of
ROC groups worsens the situation. Together, these
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developments weaken the democratic transition process in
Russia.
Corruption is the most prevalent form of illicit
pressure in Russian politics. According to findings from a
survey of entrepreneurs in Russia, 90 percent of all
respondents were convinced that it was impossible to do
business without giving bribes to various state agencies.
The same survey revealed that sixty-five percent of
businessmen bribed persons working in financial and
auditing bodies, 55 percent bribed deputies at different
levels, 32 percent bribed police and police officials, and
27 percent bribed judges and prosecutors (Glinkina, 1996.
p.65). A 1994 report on the work of the agencies of
internal affairs, published by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of the Russian Federation describes the following
structure of corrupt persons charged with criminal
activities:
People employed in ministries, on committees, and by
regional governments-47 percent of those charged;
personnel of law enforcement agencies-29 percent;
people working in the credit and financial system-13
percent; personnel involved in inspection and
supervision-5 percent; employees of the Customs
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Service 4 percent; and deputies-2 percent (Ryvkina,
1998. p.40).
It is maintained that corruption reaches all the way
to the top levels of the government, as the bribes for
government officials cost organized crime groups up to 30
to 50 percent of their profits (United States Congressional
Testimony, 1999). According to Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index [CPI Score relates to
perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business
people,risk analysts and the general public and ranges
between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)] for 2000,
Russia scored only 2.1 and shared the 82nd place with Kenya,
out of 90 countries around the world (Transparency
International [TI], 2001).
Flexing its muscle is another method utilized by ROC
to influence the decisions of politicians or remove the
politicians who are interfering with its business. The
mafia has murdered members of the parliament and
intimidated others. According to Itar-Tass, the official
broadcasting agency of Russian Federation, 5 members of
Russian Parliamentary Assembly Duma and 10 members of
Regional Parliamentary Assemblies around Russia were
murdered between 1992 and 1999; most of these cases were
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associated with mafia but investigations reached nowhere
(Norwegian Institute of International Relations, 1999).
In today`s Russia, ROC has reached a stage of
development in which it attempts to become legal. After
trying all forms of covert pressure (bribes, buy-offs,
joint criminal activity with representatives of power
structures) it is now taking more and more active steps
toward the legalization of its leaders and toward exerting
direct influence on the political process (Kryshtanovskaia,
1996). ROC`s attempts to undermine the political process
have exceeded the corruption level in some cases and direct
participation in decision making was sought, as exemplified
by several cases. The penetration of organized crime into
the state exists from the municipal up to the federal level
as organized crime groups have financed the election of
candidates and members of the newly elected Russian
parliament as well as those of other CIS republics, says
the well known expert on the field, Louise Shelley (1995a).
Direct participation attempts in the political process by
criminals were highly visible in the 1995 Duma elections.
By October 1995, over 100 suspected criminals had already
declared their candidacy for the Duma elections in December
of that year. There is no information on hand to verify the
72
percentage of these suspected criminals who were elected to
Duma that year, but the primary motivation behind this
interest is clear; in Russia legislators have absolute
immunity, they can not be searched, detained, questioned,
charged, arrested, tried or convicted, even for crimes they
have committed before taking office (DiPaola, 1997).
More strikingly, the Russian public witnessed the
establishment of a political party by a well-known
organized crime figure, Otari Kvantrishvili, under the name
of Sportsmen of Russia. The party had presented its own
candidates for the elections to the State-Duma and for
presidential elections of Russia, but these plans were not
destined to be realized, Kvantrishvili`s murder in the
summer of 1994 put an end to the business.
In April 1994 one of the criminal groups under the
control of Evgenii Podanev, established a Christian Liberal
Party in Crimea, but three months later he was murdered.
His successors M. Korchelava, another criminal and
businessmen Rulev shared the same fate in less than one
month and Christian Liberal Party came to an abrupt end
(Kryshtanovskaia, 1996).
Financing and support of parties is the last legal
pressure tool employed by some ROC groups such as the most
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powerful Slavic gang Solntsev. This group is alleged to be
in close contact with Russian National Unity Party, which
is a nationalist, neo-nazi, paramilitary, overtly anti-
Semitic organization, formed in 1990. Barkashov, the leader
of Russian National Unity Party, has had a number of talks
with Davydov, the leader of the Solntsev group
(Kryshtanovskaia, 1996).
Transnational political manipulation
Attempts of ROC to manipulate the political process
are not limited to Russia. Israel, one of the target
countries of ROC, is a good example to highlight the issue.
Israel was shaken with the allegations that Gregory Lerner,
a major ROC crime figure attempted to bribe former Prime
Minister Shimon Peres and some other Knesset members and
cabinet ministers in 1996. Before this turmoil was set
down, Benjamin Netanyahu was alleged to have received 1.5
million dollars as campaign contributions from Grigory
Loutchansky, a Latvian-born convicted felon and president
of the Austrain based NORDEX, a multinational trading
company. Loutchansky had been implicated in everything from
major money laundering to smuggling nuclear components
(Friedman, 2000. p.267).
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Another interesting example of transnational intrusion
by ROC into the politics is its attempts in the American
political system. Even though, these efforts are still
infant, some of them are worth to be mentioned briefly for
the purposes of this study. The invitation of above
mentioned Loutchansky to a Democratic National Committee
fundraising dinner for Clinton in 1993 by Democrats was
amazing, he has even shaken hands with Clinton and Clinton
asked him to pass a message to Ukrainian government
requesting it to reduce its nuclear stockpile? (Friedman,
2000. p. 268). When CIA discovered this, agency officials
were shocked. One congressional investigator spoke on the
issue as following: Loutchansky had one thing in mind:
legitimization, he wanted US citizenship and he wanted to
buy a US bank (Friedman, 2000. p. 268). Not long after this
case, a partner of Loutchansky at NORDEX, Ukrainian mob
boss Vadim Rabinovich who served an eight-year jail term in
Ukrainian prisons for theft of state goods, attended a
Clinton-Gore fundraiser in 1995 in Miami. His picture
between a smiling Clinton and Gore appeared in Eastern
European press, greatly adding to the mobster`s reputation
(Friedman, 2000. p. 269). The list is long; it goes from
the attendance of another ROC figure, Vahtang Ubiriya, one
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of the top criminal lieutenants of Semion Mogilevich who
according to CIA, is the most dangerous gangster in the
world, to a Republican Part fund-raising dinner. A
Ukrainian figure, who according to FBI is a member of
fearful Ivankov ROC organization, namely Semyon Kislin`s
being a top campaign supporter for Rudy Giuliani of New
York and ultimately his appointment by the mayor to the New
York City`s Economic Board of Development Corporation are
some striking examples.
Control of civil society
It is a fact that civil society groups, such as
lobbies, associations, committees, and unions play an
important role in shaping the politics through the pressure
they exert. They could be named as the security valves of
democracy since they are directly formed by certain
segments of the population in pursuant of protecting their
interests in particular and people’s in general. Democracy
basically cannot survive without having a strong civil
society behind it and organized crime’s strategy for
influencing the legislative process may take a form of
invalidating the organization and operation of civil
society. The most efficient methods in this process are
gaining the control of flow of information by owning media
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resources and corruption and intimidation of the members of
the press. Shaping the political debate in their favor is
the aim of organized crime in this relationship with media.
The same methods, bribery and intimidation, can also be
employed against the leaders of the civil society groups by
preventing the formation of interests which are not
compatible with theirs. This ongoing process undermines the
important values of democracy, such as freedom of speech
and association, in a considerable manner.
According to Dipaola (1997), some ROC groups purchased
entire media enterprises when the government privatized
them, while others subsidized struggling newspapers and
television networks or resorted to bribery, in Russia. For
example, the MOST group owns Segodnia newspaper and has
established MTV television (Shelley, 1995a. p.839). While
Segodnia and MTV are the most independent and hard-hitting
members of the mass media, main analysts wonder whether
their independence will be eventually be undermined by
their owner. The banking sector, dominated by organized
crime, has also been able to enter into television through
the privatization process. When Ostankino, the most widely
viewed national channel, was sold, forty-nine percent of
its shares were acquired by banks (Shelley, 1995a. p.840).
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However, the most common methods of controlling the
media have been intimidation and murder. Journalists
pursuing investigative stories on corruption and organized
crime have found themselves at great risk stated a 1997
report from the New-York-based committee to protect
journalists, especially in Russia and Ukraine where
beatings have become routine (Friedman, 2000). According to
the report, 13 journalists from the Russian Federation have
been killed by the mob since the fall of communism. The
International Federation of Journalists (2000), an
independent watch-group who publishes an annual report each
year detailing the killing of journalists around the world,
confirms the death of 12 journalists in Russia including
one American in 1999.
Committee to Protect Journalists (2000), a non-profit
organization, dedicated to the global defense of press
freedom stated that 24 journalists were killed in Russia
during the year 2000. In both reports most of the killings
were associated with the anti-corruption efforts of the
deceased journalists. The following case, excerpted from
the website of International Freedom of Expression Exchange
(1998), which is affiliated with United Nations Economic
and Social Council, is illustrative:
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On 12 February 1998, the Prosecutor-General's office
charged Pavel Popovskikh, a retired military officer,
with planning and participating in Dmitri Kholodov's
murder. The 27-year-old journalist, who wrote
extensively on corruption in the Russian military
before his death, was killed when a booby-trapped
briefcase he had collected from a source at Moscow's
Kazanski railroad station exploded in his newspaper's
offices. Kholodov, who had been investigating
organized crime connections with the military, had
been told the attaché case contained secret documents
exposing corruption at the military's highest levels.
The newspaper's editors accused the military,
including then Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev,
of ordering the contract killing. General Grachev
blamed the Russian mafia.
Speaking of civil society, it has to be stated that
civil society in Russia today is underdeveloped: it is in a
transitional stage; many of its elements have been
suppressed or blocked for centuries through a legacy of
Czarist and Communist rules. The autonomy of different
social environments and associations; economic enterprises,
universities, science, civic organizations, professional
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unions, religious organizations as well as press is vital
for a democratic rule and the autonomy of state. It is
basically a checks and balances situation. Numerous
independent associations, societies, organizations, and
movements exist today in Russian society, creating good
preconditions for the further development of civil society
(Golenkova, 1999). However, ROC is assuming much of the
state`s authority, and views the civil society as a threat
to its existence. Yet, civil society in Russia is already
dominated by organized crime, since the formation of these
groups require financial power besides the enthusiasm.
Louise Shelley (1996. p.129) perfectly reveals this
connection:
“Many criminalized companies which, having illegally
privatized state resources, now support sports teams
and other performance groups as a way of currying
favor. Heads of crime groups have sponsored sports
clubs. The significant role that the criminalized
banking sector has assumed in the development of civil
society has prevented the emergence of truly
autonomous groups. Many charity funds have been used
to launder money. The recent indictment in New York of
individuals who embezzled from the Chernobyl victims`
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fund raises serious questions about the propriety of
the management of this Russian charity”.
Ironically, the anomie in Russia fosters the growth of
authoritarianism, the need for a strong leader and
authoritarian state, concepts that are not quite compatible
with the idea of a strong civil society. The reflections of
authoritarianism in parliamentary elections were tried to
be exposed above, yet; its manifestations in the policy
making and execution process are equally problematic.
Prosecution of organized crime in a given society
requires the allocation of huge resources. It proves to be
hard for governments, especially the financially troubled
ones, to compete with powerful organized criminal groups
and the picture gets darker when there is widespread
corruption. Struggling with organized crime under these
circumstances, which Russian case perfectly exemplifies,
policy makers and crime fighters choose to get tough, even
it means violation of the given country`s constitution and
the individuals` rights. The most significant measure
presently used by Russian State to combat organized crime
is the June 1994 presidential decree entitled, On the
Urgent Measures to Defend the Population Against
Gangsterism and other kinds of Organized Crime. According
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to the decree, suspects could be detained for thirty days
without a prosecutor`s warrant, authorities may deny the
right to bail, defendants can not examine documents before
the opening of a criminal case, commercial and banking
privacy may be voided for those suspected of organized
criminal activity. The head of the Moscow Helsinki Group,
Kronid Liubarsky says that human rights have often been
violated in the name of the decree (Shelley, 1995a. p.843).
Sergey Stepashin, then head of the FSB (Federal Security
Service -new version of KGB) was reported commenting on the
issue as: I am all for the violation of human rights if the
human is a bandit or a criminal (AI, 1997).
According to Amnesty International (AI, 2000) Russia
country report, torture and ill treatment by law
enforcement officers to extract confessions continued to be
reported. Detainees were threatened with death; beaten,
sometimes to the point of losing consciousness; tied in
painful positions; scalded with boiling water; almost
asphyxiated by having plastic bags placed over their heads
or by being forced to wear gas masks with the supply of
oxygen repeatedly cut or restricted; and denied food and
medical care. Taking into consideration most of the
criminals have serious connections with the government
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mechanism and financial power to bribe the officials, it
would not be unfair to estimate that most of the people who
are detained related to organized crime and forced to
suffer these inhuman conditions are small fishes or
innocents.
Destabilization in national economies:
Protection rackets
Financial instability, inefficiency in the markets and
structural problems are either created or contributed by
organized crime and all have negative effects on the
democratic govern ability at the end.
An economic theory of organized crime assumes that
criminal groups are organized, rational and will act like
business corporations in deciding what criminal activities
they will participate. In black market economies have
existed in all countries, however in most cases organized
crime prospers only through traditional criminal sources of
revenue like drugs, gambling, smuggling contraband and
prostitution. In the new Russia, the situation is
different, as one author suggested; organized crime wields
power over all the economy and the problem is that
disassociating the further economic development of the
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Russian state from the pervasiveness of organized crime
could prove impossible (Williams, 1997. p.56).
Protection rackets deserve to be mentioned first,
which organized crime employs coercion and oppression as a
method to produce fear in the society in a way to
substitute or overlap the protection ensured by the state
to derive these illegal taxes from the businesses. While
this application corrodes the authority of the government
as the only imposer of the taxes in theory, it also
increases the price of goods and services subject to this
illegal taxation and discourages would-be entrepreneurs
from starting legitimate businesses. In chronic cases,
facing with the widespread violence, extra-costs of doing
business and witnessing the loss of legitimization of the
political regime, flight of foreign capital can be
observed, either, due to the fact that nobody would like to
risk its investment. This could have devastating effects on
the national economies of developing and transitional
countries, which deadly need national and international
investment on their territories.
Russia is a haven for protection rackets operated by
the ROC groups, not only because the criminals are so
powerful but also the legislative framework is inadequate
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to deal with the basics of a capitalist system. Michael
McFaul, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace where he co-directs the Russian
Domestic Politics project, had stated in a 1995 article
that the state has not institutionalized a legal system to
protect (private) property rights, govern bankruptcy
procedures, enforce contracts, protect consumers, and
ensure competition. Contracts must be totally self-
enforcing to work because the state cannot enforce them
(Dipaola, 1997. p.7). After six years, there is nothing
changed, criminal groups continue to fill the gap and
present their services to the citizens; unable to turn to
the government, the people put their trust in ROC groups to
enforce contracts, either willingly or unwillingly. One of
the most important terms of business in Russia is “kyrsha”
which literally means roof and practically refers to an
umbrella of protection. Kyrsha can come in the form of a
criminal overlord protecting members of his organization or
a criminal group`s declaring that a specific business is
paying it extortion money; kyrsha also can include certain
forms of corrupt government protection, including the
militsya, tax police, the military, customs and border
guards (CSIS, 1997. p.29).
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According to police figures, organized crime controls
as much as 40 percent of the Russian economy based on its
take from protection rackets, market manipulation, and
partnership schemes-a number largely unchanged since the
mid-1990s (Handelman, 2000). Grigory Yavlinsky, a Russian
economist and the leader of the leader of Yabloko, a
democratic, reformist political party currently in
opposition says that anyone who attempts to start a small
business in Russia will encounter extortion demands from
the mafia, so there is no incentive for entrepreneurship
(Yavlinsky, 1998. p.71).
Deterring foreign investment
Kyrsha schemes have deterring effects on foreign
investments in Russia. Extra costs of protection will
naturally discourage the foreign firms which are already
overwhelmed with the crippling federal and local Russian
taxes which can consume as much as ninety percent of the
profits (Dipaola, 1997). Besides, for American firms the
Russian market has another disadvantage; FCPA (Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act) which prohibits the payments of
bribes to foreign officials to secure business advantages
and requires US companies to maintain stringent accounting
standards so as to preclude the establishments of slush
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funds to provide funds for such illicit payments (Boylan,
1999). Taking into consideration that it is almost
impossible to do business in Russia without bribing the
bureaucrats directly or indirectly, the picture gets bleak
for Russia itself; American capital is the strongest in the
world and not many U.S. business would be willing to enter
into Russian market under these circumstances.
Money laundering and infiltration of financial sectors
Illegal gains derived from the organized crime
activities and its infiltration of these proceedings into
the economy creates another set of problems. Money
laundering is the financial side of the crime that is
committed for profit. To truly profit from their crime,
criminals must find a way to insert their proceeds into the
stream of legitimate commerce. They must launder their
dirty money in order to spend it or reinvest it in their
criminal enterprises. Money laundering is important in two
respects. First it provides the cash that allows criminals
to conduct their criminal enterprises. Second, in an age of
rapidly advancing technology and globalization, the
uncontrolled laundering of large sums of money can cause
financial instability. Criminal organizations may enter the
financial sector; these groups` setting up private banks
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and financial institutions for the aim of money laundering
are not unusual events for the law enforcement officials
throughout the world. Abuse of the legitimate system and
erosion of the legal institutions through complex schemes
might have negative consequences on the stability of the
whole system
Intrusion of huge amounts of money into a market means
a money emission boom. Since this money is not created as a
result of a legal production process, buying power of the
money will decrease, because the amount of goods and
services` supply will not be at the same level with the
demand side. To the least, the prices of the goods and
services, which the laundered money is directed, will rise
considerably, leading to an unfair competition. Unfair
circumstances for the legal business may arise in cases
that the criminal groups choose to set up front companies
for money laundering, not for making profits, too. They
could sell their goods and services under the cost price,
which breaks the ability of the legal businesses operating
in the same sector to compete.
Russia faces a considerable challenge in combating
money laundering owing to its unique transition to a market
economy. The existence of a continued large-scale capital
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flight, underdeveloped market institutions and lack of
fiscal resources all complicate the fight against money
laundering. Virtually all the former socialist states of
Eastern and Central Europe present the potential for money
laundering, since privatization and the banking system are
going through process of revision and old authority
structures and means of regulation are being shaped (Savona
& Adamoli, 1996). Only nine years before, there were only
four banks in the Soviet Union all closely regulated
(Savona & Adamoli, 1996). In early 2000, the Russian
Central Bank reported that there were just approximately
1,350 credit organizations in Russia. Some banks, however,
have continued to operate without a license (Business
Information Service for the Newly Independent States,
2000). On top of this, Russia`s Ministry of Internal
Affairs, the government agency in charge of combating ROC,
estimated in 1997 that between 50 percent and 85 percent of
banks are controlled by organized crime groups (CSIS, 1997.
p.2).
Financial Action Task Force, the most effective
intergovernmental institution tasked with combating money
laundering says in its report published in year 2000:
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“While Russia faces many obstacles in meeting
international standards for the prevention, detection
and prosecution of money laundering, currently the
most critical barrier to improving its money
laundering regime is the lack of a comprehensive anti-
money laundering law and implementing regulations that
meet international standards. Russia lacks:
comprehensive customer identification requirements; a
suspicious transaction reporting system; a fully
operational FIU with adequate resources; and effective
and timely procedures for providing evidence to assist
in foreign money laundering prosecutions” (Financial
Action Task Force, 2001).
Taking a look at the following case, which is also the
biggest money laundering case in the US history, would be
helpful for a better understanding of ROC associated money
laundering operations and their transnational implications:
“Between October 1998 and March 1999, around $4.2
billion was processed at the Bank of New York through
accounts under the control of a company that
reportedly was used by Russian businessmen to launder
illegally obtained funds from Russia. The account was
kept open to allow investigators to follow the trail
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of funds, and an estimated total of at least $10
billion (with some estimates going as high as $15
billion) is believed to have been processed through
the account “(National Council for Science and
Environment, 2000).
Capital flight
ROC groups may not be the only responsible party for
Russia's fiscal, banking, and investment problems, but they
certainly contribute to their severity by exacerbating
systemic problems. A minimum of 40 percent of the estimated
$2 billion in monthly capital flight is attributable to
organized crime groups (Shelley, 1997). ROC reinvest little
of its profits, instead it frequently transfers its
proceeds to more secure West European and offshore
financial centers.
Capital flight phenomenon in Russia distinguishes ROC
from the classic transnational organized crime groups.
Capital flight is an abnormal conversion of financial
assets from the national currency to assets in a more
stable currency usually in response to or in anticipation
of heightened financial risk. Russian capital flight has
taken various forms; by Russian residents' conversion of
rubles into dollars for use as currency on the black market
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or as a means of savings for later conversion back into
rubles; by directors of newly privatized companies buying
raw materials in domestic markets, selling-generally
smuggling- them in foreign markets and keeping the profits
offshore in a way to avoid Russian exchange controls and
Russian taxation, by Russian firms` fictitious imports and
sending hard currency abroad for expenses. According to an
estimate of Russia`s Ministry of Internal Affairs, more
than 40,000 private enterprises were either established by
or are now controlled by criminal organizations in Russia
and from 70 to 80 percent of private and privatized firms
and commercial banks are forced to pay criminal groups;
corrupt officials and racketeers (Voronin, 1997). The
extent of the capital flight-ROC connection can be
comprehended better by bearing the mentioned numbers of
economic establishments associated with ROC in mind.
Consequences of capital flight on the Russian economy are
perilous; it represents foregone investment in
manufacturing plants, infrastructure, and other productive
capacity. Russia desperately requires capital for
investment to rebuild its outdated infrastructure, to
modernize its industrial base, and to upgrade labor skills.
Capital flight therefore, inhibits Russian economic growth
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and development, depressing Russian living standards. In
the meantime, flighted capital escapes Russian taxation
depriving the Russian government of revenues contributing
to fiscal deficits and constraining expenditures on social
welfare programs, defense, and infrastructure
redevelopment. Furthermore, the magnitude of tax evasion by
the wealthy class, an opportunity not open to middle class
and the poor, accentuates income disparities and aggravates
social instability.
Since the eighteenth century, philosophers and
scholars have agreed that capitalism constitutes the
economic and social-structural foundation of parliamentary
democracy and this agreement has been supported by the
actual pattern of democratic development around the globe
(Kullberg & Zimmermann, 1999). It is evident that
development of capitalism carries a vital importance for
the success of democratic reforms. For Russia, the picture
is not promising; organized criminals are strangling
capitalism that could be accepted as a newborn baby after
centuries of czarist and communist rules, neither of which
allowed the growing of a free market. Unfortunately, it is
a fact that the absurdities in socio-economic life of so-
called free market democracy of Russia today far exceed the
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ones in the past. The following response of an ordinary
Russian citizen on the question of a Western observer
relevant to the organized crime`s effects reflects the
disillusionment of masses is, sad;
“Initially I think I should say that it`s strange that
you (interviewer) should be so interested in the Mafia`s
effects on the economy because the Mafia arose from the
reforms and policies implemented in Russia following the
abortive 1991 hard-line Communist coup. It is strange
because these models of reform and privatization all came
from you people in the West. With this in mind, I find it
very strange that you are studying the consequences of your
actions after the fact” (Rollins, 1998. p.5).
Threats to the national securities of other countries
As stated in the first chapter, finding answers to
research questions regarding to the political-economical
effects of transnational organized crime and the pre-
conditions for efficient response is the main aim of this
study. However, again, it is crucial to bear in mind that
organized crime groups, their operations and consequences
take shape according to the social, political and economic
systems they operate in. In this context, it proves to be
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hard to make generalizations depending on the results of a
single case study, as we have here.
There are two major transnational threats arising from
the ROC operations: the law enforcement dimension and the
national security dimension. First, ROC poses a serious
threat to law enforcement; both in Russia and the other
countries it operates. Engagement of ROC groups in all
types of illicit activity on a transnational basis is a
serious concern. Needless to mention the social
consequences of these operations, as they increase
conducting criminal activities in other countries, the
costs of law enforcement increase and are passed to
taxpayers.
One of the most destructive aspects of ROC activity is
financial activity, which is not only a problem for Russia
but also for the world. Criminals in Russia are laundering
money throughout the world, and the proceeds are not only
invested in illegal sectors, but in legitimate business
activities, which has a potential to inhibit fair
competition. Corruption of key officials, utilizing banks,
stock exchanges, capital opportunities and commodities
markets of target countries all undermine the financial
security of the countries operated in. Another worldwide
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concern from law enforcement standpoint is increasing
connections between ROC and other transnational organized
criminal groups. Following are some examples of these
alliances.
Russian organized crime groups have used their ties to
Italian criminal groups to establish extensive businesses
in Italy--investing as much as $4-7 billion between 1993
and 1995 alone, according to Italian trade industry
estimates--primarily to facilitate money laundering;
Russian and Italian criminals cooperate in international
drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and counterfeiting.
(Terrorism Research Center, 1998)
To date, U.S. law enforcement officials have
established a clear relationship between ROC groups and La
Cosa Nostra (LCN), the Italian–American criminal network in
the United States. The LCN is cooperating with ROC groups
on activities related to gambling, extortion, prostitution,
and fraud (CSIS, 1997. p.44).
Cooperative efforts between ROC groups and the
Colombian drug cartels are centered in Miami, where the
local FBI office characterized the Russian gangsters as
very brutal...they are very sophisticated (CSIS, 1997.
p.44).
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ROC is also reported to be involved in criminal
activity with other major international OC groups,
including the Sicilian Mafia, the ’Ndrangheta, the Camorra,
the Boryokudan (Japanese Yakuza), Chinese Triads, Korean
criminal groups, Turkish drug traffickers, Colombian drug
cartels, and other South American drug organizations. These
groups have cooperated with their Russian counterparts in
international narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and
counterfeiting (CSIS, 1997. p.44).
Second, the national security dimension. USSR is
collapsed but Russia still has stocks of nuclear materials.
As one author stated, instead of a hostile Soviet
superpower, with nuclear weapons under tight totalitarian
control, the world confronts a new, more benign Russia,
which in some ways is more dangerous than the old. It is a
place where chaos is constant, where old safeguards are
eroding or already have fallen away, where nuclear know-how
and materials are suddenly for sale. The real nightmare
scenario involves Russia`s ruthless organized-crime
syndicates and corrupt government officials working in
league to create new markets for nuclear materials, a
bazaar with some of the world`s most dangerous weapons on
offer, a place where savvy buyers will know to come calling
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(Zimmermann & Cooperman, 1995. p.56). Although there is not
enough evidence to support the existence of an organized
nuclear weapons trafficking, except for a few individual
cases involving nuclear materials smuggling; there is a
good potential as long as there is demand, especially from
the rogue states. A lower-level threat is widespread theft,
diversion, and unauthorized sale of conventional weapons,
ammunition and equipment. Severe conditions in the Russian
armed forces; lack of pay for months, lack of food,
horrible living conditions, officers` moonlighting to feed
their families, startling rates of suicide in officer
corps, collapsed morale (CSIS, 1997. p.59) add to the
explosion of this phenomenon. In an interesting case, the
arrest of a ROC figure in America while negotiating a
submarine purchase between Russian military officials and
members of Medellin Cartel in 1997 in Miami revealed a six
MI8 Russian military helicopters trade in 1993 between the
Medellin cartel and Russian military figures through the
brokerage of the same ROC figure.
Another strategic threat is the destabilization of
democracy in Russia as detailed in Chapter 3; authoritarian
tendencies are on the rise in Russia. The success of
democracy in Russia is very important for stability in
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world politics after the cold war. If a communist or
fascist rules, a hostile attitude against the West in
Russia will become prevalent in the near future. The three
parliamentary election results after the collapse of




The concept of Chameleon Syndrome attempts to explain
the phases in the development of organized crime in a
society. The model recognizes four stages of development in
the relationships between the legitimate structures and
organized crime:
(1) Reactive: Organized crime operates outside of, or
contiguous to, the legitimate structures. The dominant
system is politically and economically stable and has
little or no need to compromise or negotiate.
(2) Passive assimilative: The first phase of
negotiation or compromise. The dominant system has
weakened, particularly in the economic sector, and seeks to
acquire from illegal sources, which cannot be gained
legitimately. If not actively engaged with the illegal
suppliers, it turns a blind eye to those who are. This
phase is important in terms of the evolution of the shadow
economy, accompanied by low level bribery and corruption.
(3) Active assimilative: Penetration of organized
crime into the legitimate structures to an extent that it
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would have the opportunity to act with a high degree of
autonomy. Organized crime has a direct effect on the
condition of the legitimate structures; money laundering,
high levels of bribery and active presence in the
legitimate economy is common.
(4) Proactive: Organized crime is the major power
holder. It has penetrated all the structures of power,
including the media, and no longer needs to negotiate on
the terms favored by the political system (Rawlinson, 1997.
p. 29).
It is not fictitious to assume that ROC has almost
reached at the proactive phase, owing to its domination in
privatization, banking system, financial markets and
businesses and its manipulation power of the political
figures and media in the era of capitalism and free market
democracy in Russia.
The Russian government`s efforts to combat organized
crime have been severely impeded due to the extensive
corruption at both policy planning and execution levels
within the Russian government. Narrow minded get-tough
policies rather than focusing on the development of a
legislative foundation for a free market society, produced
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no meaningful action. The then Human Rights Chief Sergey
Kovalev stated that:
“You announced amid publicity, the start of a fight
against organized crime in the country. To that end, you
gave enormous powers, going beyond the bounds of right and
the law, to the power structures. The result? Criminals
still roam free, while law-abiding citizens, without having
gained security, are forced to tolerate the tyranny of
people in uniform into the bargain” (CSIS, 1997, p.64), in
his resignation letter to the then President Boris Yeltsin.
Besides the problems sourcing from the unsuccessful
crime prevention programs and the pervasive corruption,
Russian government basically does not have the resources to
change the conditions that support organized crime. Law
enforcement elements lack the adequate equipment and suffer
from low wages close to poverty level.
The answer to the question “What should be done?” was
not the purpose of the present research, nonetheless, any
study on this field cannot ignore it completely. A legal
framework which makes it possible to fight organized crime
such as measures aimed at prosecution of offenders,
detection, seizure and confiscation of assets, formation of
a strong, independent and incorruptible judiciary that will
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hold corrupted officials accountable besides the criminals,
a capable law enforcement apparatus in terms of training,
equipment and financial resources to address the problems
of organized crime at all levels, and increasing
international cooperation and coordination between Russian
fighting agencies and their counterparts in other countries
where ROC operates are all part of the broad recipe to cure
this infection. However, the realization of all these aims
virtually remain impracticable unless the policy makers
should go about reducing the demand for organized crime and
corruption. To achieve this goal, various steps are to be
taken in economic and political field: separating business
from political power, regulation of the operations of
individual businesses, provisions for bankruptcy, banking
and contract enforcement laws, promoting free competition
by encouraging small and medium sized businesses to ensure
the establishment of a middle class, decentralization of
financial resources and implementation of lower and simpler
taxes are essentially needed. Furthermore, simplification
of regulation of state controls, systematization of the
work carried out by different state agencies and reduction
of the number of unneeded state institutions and staff,
applying of income declaration procedure for state
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employees starting from the top level, assuring
transparency of political parties, enduring the
coordination of efforts of the civil society groups such as
educational, religious organizations and media and finally
formation at the federal level of a coordinating body
responsible for the execution of the strategy for combating
corruption are some of the vital tools to be used in
struggling with corruption.
Anti-corruption and anti-organized crime measures
require a real commitment by political leaders to seriously
undertake these campaigns and such commitment is
surprisingly hard to come by, in part because the leaders
themselves often emerge at the top without completely clean
hands, and in part because the commitment can be both
socially and personally costly (Leitzel, 1998, p.10).
Whatever the extent of the corruption level is, certain
elements of the Russian government have made sincere
efforts to address the organized crime and corruption
problem by risking their own personal safety and careers.
These efforts have been supported by the actions of a
number of politicians and media members, some of whom
already paid the costs with their lives as we stated
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before. The efforts of these individuals should be
encouraged and supported in every possible way.
As it is the case with the struggle against the
activities of other transnational organized crime groups,
ROC activities cannot be contained by the campaign of a
single country, as well. Countries, which were infected by
ROC virus, should make a clear definition of ROC and
broaden their bases of knowledge about it, statistics
should be kept, intelligence databases should be formed and
exchange of information among these countries must be
encouraged. Training programs, equipment and financial
support must be provided by the developed countries to
Russian law enforcement agencies. In fact, this support
should not be limited to law enforcement agencies, but
other actors of Russian bureaucracy must be supported in
similar ways by respective agencies of the related
governments, as well. Financial aids aiming to recover the
collapsed Russian economy by individual countries and
intra-governmental organizations must be continued,
however, strict control mechanisms must be established for
preventing the diversion of these funds into the hands of
corrupted officials and criminals.
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The challenges posed by transnational organized crime,
are showing signs of becoming a substantial danger to the
political, social and economic stability of states,
especially if its enormous financial power is taken into
account. Organized crime has been fueled by the new
patterns of international trade and progress made in
communications and transportation, jointly known as
globalization that will continue to change the nature of
organized crime. While large criminal organizations will
remain powerful players with worldwide networks, a large
number of highly skilled freelancer criminal entrepreneurs
empowered by high-tech computer skills and
telecommunications capabilities will challenge law
enforcement agencies. These individuals, who might be hired
by organized crime groups, could cause substantial public
and private-sector losses, potentially even undermining the
integrity of the institutions they target and compromising
market stability. The following is a good example:
“Six people have been arrested in a scam by Russian
computer hackers who stole more than $10 million from a
Citibank electronic money transfer system by wiring funds
to accounts around the world. The money was shifted from
Citibank to accounts in Finland, Russia, Germany, the
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Netherlands, the United States, Israel and Switzerland”
(Six arrested, 1995).
Another scenario would be the emergence of large
interactive networks of smaller, independent organizations,
which cooperate on the basis of comparative advantage.
Crime groups within these networks would specialize in
specific activities; advances in computer and financial
technology increases the anonymity and speed of commercial
and financial transactions, offering criminals more
efficient and secure ways to smuggle illicit drugs and
contraband, penetrate legitimate businesses, and launder
and move money: Greater regional economic integration such
as European Union and NAFTA as well as worldwide
interdependence of national economies will make it easier
for criminal organizations to operate on an international
scale. Improvements in transportation to facilitate
international trade will increase the volume, speed, and
efficiency of smuggling and commercial transactions by
transnational crime groups.
The magnitude of the problem will depend on the global
political and economic conditions, the extent and
effectiveness of measures taken to reduce societal or
systemic vulnerabilities, and the degree to which national
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law enforcement around the world develop appropriate
cooperative mechanisms enabling them to operate outside the
parameters of national sovereignty and legal jurisdictions.
Policy solutions cannot be homogenous, because the very
nature of transnational organized crime precludes any one
country from launching an effective campaign against
organized crime groups, which exploit conflicting criminal,
banking, and investment laws and law enforcement practices
among different countries. As Shelley maintained,
successful policy must seek international harmonization in
legislation combating crimes in the areas of banking,
securities law, customs and extradition in order to reduce
the opportunities for criminal activity and minimize the
infiltration of transnational organized crime groups into
legitimate business (1995a). Extradition and mutual legal
assistance treaties should be formed to inhibit the
avoidance of criminals from detection besides the
establishment of a coordinated law enforcement and
intelligence sharing mechanism with relate to the
activities of transnational crime groups.
In this research ROC, the socio-economic context it
was born in and has flourished on, its actions and effects
on the political economy of Russia and related countries
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were studied and pre-conditions for a broad response
against it were attempted to be established. In each
specific transnational organized crime group case, the
social and economic problems behind the explosion of
organized criminal activity should be carefully
investigated and proper ways to cure them should be
searched for. Legislative efforts and law enforcement is
doomed to fail unless the fertile ground which organized
crime prospers on is terminated. In this context, the
solution of economic, social and political problems that
lead to moral degradation and systematic corruption carries
a particular importance.
Before the end of the cold-war period, national
security threats were clearly defined, generally based on
the membership of either one of the opposite two blocs. The
international system, which was ironically stable then, has
turned into a chaotic environment in the last decade,
despite the expectations of the emergence of a “New World
Order”. It would be wrong to assume that transnational
organized crime was a product of this anarchic atmosphere
but it obviously enjoys its golden age in this era of world
history. The next question is, as Sterling suggested, a
'Pax Mafiosa' (1994b), (the concept that international
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organized crime groupings are working together efficiently
and harmoniously, and dividing the globe between them) is
really under formation or not? It would be a mistake to
take this too far at the moment, but it is evident that
world states have not the luxury to take the transnational
criminal activity as a sole law enforcement problem
anymore. The menace stemming from the transnational
organized criminal activity to the national securities of
the countries is growing and stabilization of the
international political-economic system is clearly under
attack. Unless proper measures are taken in national and
international level, the transformation of the “Pax
Mafiosa” myth into true is not a distance possibility.
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